ADDRESS BY SENATOR STRa-1 THURMOND (D-SC) BEFORE THE VIRGINIA STATE
BAR ASSOCIATION AT WHITE SULPHUR SPRINGS, WEST VIRGINIA, AUGUST 6,
1955, ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT.
Meeting with you here tonight is a great pleasure and privilege.
I · consider ti an unusual honor to have been invited to speak before
such a distinguished association, The States of Virginia and South
Carolina have always had common interests and common objectives.
I hope this fraternity will grow closer with time. Certainly, in
the United States ·Senate, I have · felt a strong fraternity with the
distinguished Senators representing you. No State is better
represented in the Senate than Virginia and I am happy to count
Senat er Robertson and Senator Byrd as my friends.
·
The subject I wish to discuss tonight is one about which I
have been deeply disturbed. I know that you, too, have been concerned
with recent events involving ·the separation of powers of the three
branches of the Federal Government and the division of rights
between the Federal Government and the States.
I still believe in the United States Constitution as a living
document, immutable except by the processes established when it was
written to amend it legally. Believing this, I wish to cite
several provisions of this vital instrument of the American c,.- : "'1 ....
government.
To begin with, the Constitution provides in Article I, Section 1,
that.: "All legislative powers here.in granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives."
In view of recent developments in our judicial system, I
felt it appropriate to read this section of the Constitution again
as you and I have read and re-read it many times in the past. I
hope that members of the federal judiciary will read it and re-read
it again in the future.
Section 8 of Article I enumerates the powers of the Congress.
Section 9 of Article I spells out specific prohibitions and
limitations on the powers of the Congress.
Section 10 of Article I defines limitations on the power of
the States and, further, specifies additional limitations which
require approval of the Congress prior to action by the States.
Even the clarity of these provisions did not satisfy many of the
people when the Constitution was finally ratified by the nine
requisite States to become effective in 1789. Several States
ratified only after long debate and the adoption of recommendations
that a Bill of Rights be added to make some of the provisions even
clearer.

A total of 124 amendments were proposed by the States for
inclusion in the Bill of Rights. Seventeen amendments were accepted
by the House, two of which later were rejected by the Senate. The
remaining 15 were reduced to 12 before final approval by the Congress.
The States rejected two of the proposals and thereby the Bill of
Rights was distilled to the original 10 amendments.
The first eight amendments listed certain rights specifically
retained by the people. The Ninth stated that the "enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people."
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And the Tenth Amendment declared:

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitutie1-:
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
Although this amendment did not, of itself, add power to the
States, or to the Federal Government, the Tenth A~endment did make
clear the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the understanding of the States in ratifying the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights.
James Madison has been quoted as saying:
"Interference with the power of the States was no constitutiona l
criterion of the powe~ .of Congress. If the power was not given,
Congress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it,
although it should interfere with the laws, or even the Constitutions
of the States."
I have no argument with that conception of the power of the
Congress. My contention is that legislative power, not granted even
to the Congress, by the C.o nstitution or by statute, has been
assumed by the Judiciary. By assumption of such Power, the Suprern.e
Court has not only seized power granted the Legislative Branch
alone, but the Court has also invaded the specifically reserved
rights of the States.
On occasion a President of the United States has attempted to
usurp power vested in the Congress. The most recent example was
the steel seizure case. On April 8, 1952, President Truman issued
an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize
and operate most of the steel mills of the country. His purpose
was to avoid a nation-wide strike of steel workers during the
Korean War.
President Truman issued the seizure order 11 by virtue · of
authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and as President of the United States and Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States ••• "
By a six to three opinion the Supreme Court upheld an injuncti.on
of the district court restraining the seizure. Justice Black wrote
the majority opinion in which he pointed out that no statute expressly
authorized or implied authorization for the President to seize
the steel mills; that in its consideration of the Taft-:-Hartley Act
in 1947, the Congress refused to authorize government seizure of
property as a means of preventing work stoppages and settling labor
disputes. He also declared that the power sought to be exercised
was the law-making power, which the Constitution vests in the
Congress alone. Further, he pointed out that such previous actions
by the Chief Executive did not thereby divest the Congress of its
exclusive law-making authority.
Thus the Supreme Court was quick to repel this latest attempt
by a Chief Executive to exercise authority not vested in him by the

Constitution or by statute.
But the Court's memory was short indeed when it considered the
school segregation cases. The Court itself usurped the power of the
Congress by its decision on May 17, 1954, and its decree of May 31,
1955.
By this time, you are probably wondering if I am avoiding
mention of the Fourteenth Amendment upon which the appellants in
the school cases depended for their argument that the States could
not separate the races in the public schools •
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I am not avoiding it.

I want to discuss it with you tonight.

In the first hearing, the Supreme Court asked the appellees,
including school districts in South Carolina and Virginia, to present
evidence at the rehearing, which was held in ~ecember 1953, on the
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of its
enactment. Information was required on the Congress which approved
the amendment and the States which ratified it.
The preponderance of evidence presented . in.:the briefs showed
that the Congress which approved the amendment and, the States which
ratified it, did not understand it as applying to segregation in
the schools.
As the brief in the South Carolina case pointed out, the
"debates of the 39th Congress on the First Supplemental Freedman's
Bill, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment
contain no evidence of any intention on the part of Congress to
forbid school segregration·. "
·
The brief also pointed out that "of the 37 States to which the ·
Amendment was submitted, only five abolished or prohibited segregation in their schools when they ratified the Amendment; and there
is no evidence that they· did so because they thought the Amendment
required such action rather than as a matter of local educational
policy. Of these five, three later established segregated school
systems after the Fourteenth Amendment had become a part of the
Constitution of the United States."
Nine States did not have segregated ·-,chools when the
amendment _wfis. ~s.ubmitted to·.. them .. : .' .. <.
Four _States, in which segregated schools were maintained when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, refused to ratify the
amendment, but there was no evidence in the proceedings of their
Legislatures that they did not do so because of any understanding
that the Amendment prohibited segregated schools.
Two States had segregated schools and have maintained them.
Nine Northern States were operating segregated schools and
either continued to do so or re-established them.
Eight seceded States continued to operate, or immediately
re-established, segregated schools after ratification of the
amendment.
Of course, I have merely touched on the strong evidence that
the Fourteenth Amendment was not understood at the time of its
ratification to prohibit segregated schools. But, the evidence was
well documented in the briefs presented to the Court. Significantly,
the evidence was not refuted.
However, the Court saw fit largely to disregard this evidence
for which it had asked. Commenting on the evidence, the Court said
on May 17, 1954:
" ••• This discussion and our own investigation convince us that,
although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve
the problem with which we are faced.
uAt best, they are inconclusive, The most avid proponents of
the post~war amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal
distinctions among 'all persons born or naturalized in the United
States. '
"Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both
the letter and the spirit of the amendments and wi s hed them to he:ve
the most limited effect. ~rnat oth~ ~ in Congress and the state
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legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of
certainty."
I want you to note particularly the use of the Court's words
"undoubtedly intended," in reference to what the proponents of the
Fourteenth Amendment thought. The Court cast aside the real
.
evidence presented as "inconclusive," but, by some unstated power,
arrived at the intent of dead partisans where no evidence existed.
Admitting that the question was not one of equalization of
facilities and other. "tangible" factors, the Court stated:
"Our decision, there~ore cannot turn merely on a comparison
of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved
in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of
segregation itself on public education."
This statement is clearly an admission that the decision was
not rendered on the basis of any provision of the Constitution.
Regardless of what the Court called "inconclusive" evidence, as to
the understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment when it was adopted
in 1868, the Court did not have to rely on that amendment alone in
view of the clarity of the Tenth Amendment. When the Court found
itself in doubt as to the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment--and
its questions showed doubt existed--then the Court should have
relied on other provisions of the Constitution not lacking in clarity.
However, the Court made its position still more untenable by
its comments on the time elapsed since adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Plessy v. Ferguson decision of 18-96, . by which the
doctrine of "separate but equal" school facilities was established.
The Court said:
"We cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We
must consider public education in the lights of its full development
and ·its present place in American life throughout the nation. Only
in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.u
In other words, the Court was no longer interested in the
evidence it had requested, regardless of the understanding of the
Congress which approved and the States which ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The doctrine of "separate but equal" was established on the
Constitution, and even if the Fourteenth Amendment had not existed,
the doctrine would have been fair and equitable to apply to the
expendi.ture of public funds for public schools. No responsible
official of a State government would deny the obligation of the State
to provide equal facilities for the races. Virtually all of the
Southern States have already fully complied with that doctrine.
In my own State of South Carolina more funds have been allocated
for Negro schools in the past several years than for the construction
of white schools. In less than four years, South Carolina has spent
about $150,000,000 on the construction of new schools, with
approximately 60 per cent being for Negroes. Since white pupils
outnumber Negro pupils in South Carolina by three to two, this means
that approximately twice as much per capita has been spent for
Negro pupils for school construction.
Long ago differences in teachers salaries were wiped out and
salaries based on knowledge, training, and experience. My State
is meeting the responsibility which goes with the Constitutional
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right for State regulation of public schools. I know that Virginia
and tlE e>ther .s ~ates ~r~ meetiqg the~r responsipility too.
'
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But let
···c onsider further. how the Court arrived at its decision
to destroy provisions of the Constitutions and/or the laws of 17
States and the District of Columbia. It legislated by .judicial fiat
in a field which even the Congress had not invaded~
·
Thus, in this decree, the Court disregarded the distinctions
made in the first and third articles of the .Constitution between
the powers of the Congress and the Judiciary. The same decree
also over-rode the eighth and ninth sections of Article I of the
Constitution and the Tenth Amendment, in which the rights of the .
States are enumerated.
Although th~ Court admitted that "education is perhaps the most
important functi'on of State and local gpvernments, 11 it failed to
follow that thought fo ' its logical cone lusion. . The cone lusion
would be that, in lieu of specific. Constitutional or statutory
limitation, the States have the power to operate the kind of public
schools they deem best, the equity of all pupils being protected.
-

Quoting form the ~ecisibn in the Kansas case, the Court stated:
" ' ••• A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child
to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a
tendency to retard the educational and mental development of Negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would
receive in a racially ·integrated

s_cho~l system. I
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If this thesis had validity, the Court also should have treated
the question of whether an adverse affect would result from the
mixing of children of the same age level of low~r intelligence with
those of higher intelligence. Cer.tainly differences of inferiority
and superiority would be emphasized greatly by close proximity.
What would be the effect on the pupils of higher intelligence levels?
Would they have to follow instruction geared to less intelligent
pupils? Educators have long advocated that greater opportunities
be provided for exceptional. pupils. They have not recommended mixing
·
them with less able pupils.
Still referring to the "sense of inferiority" of segregated
pupils, the Court said:
"Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge
at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported
by modern authority." Then, in a footnote, it cited a group of
psychologists. Disregarding the degree of objectivity exercised by
these psychologists, I do . question the authority of the Court to
replace the Constitution with op_inions expressed in textbooks.

On May 31 of this year, the . school cases were remanded to the
district courts, leaving to them the setting of time for compliance.
On July 15 the case which arose in Clarendon County, South Carolina,
was heard in Columbia before a three-judge federal court composed
of Judges John J. Parker, Armistead M. Dobie, and George Bell :
Timmerman. Judges Parker and Timmerman had sat on the original
court which had ruled that. the doctrine of "separate but equal"
school facilities for the races was not violative of 'the Constitutionr
In his opening remarks at the hearing on July 15, Judge Parker
said:
"Whatever may have been the views of this Court as to the l aw
when the case was originally before us, it is our duty _now to acc ept
the law as declared by the Supreme Court.
-5- '

"Having said this, it is important tha~. we point .out exactly
what the Supreme Court has decided and what it has not decided in
this case. It has no.t decided .that . the federal courts are to take
over or regulate the public :'s chools'· of the States. It has not decided
that the States must mix persons of different ·races in the schools
or must require them to attend schools or must deprive them of the
right of choosing the schools they attend. What it has decided,
and all that it has d.ecid~d,. is.. that a State may not deny to any
person on account of race the right to attend any school .that it
maintains. This, .under the decision. of the Supreme Court, the State
may not do directly or indirectly but, if the schools which it
maintains are open to children of all races, no violation of the
Constitution is involved even though the children of different races
voluntarily attend different schools, as they attend different
churches."
·
Judge Parker:•s words point clearly to a means of continued
school segregation on a voluntary basis. Were it not for the agitator«:
who have no regard for the Constitution and for the best interests of
a majority of both races, I believe volµntary segregation would work
satisfactorily.
However, I cannot tell you that I believe it will work. Already
petitions have been filed in several districts . of South Carolina,
since this hearing, asking for the admission of Negro pupils to white
schools, where facilities are equal or better for the Negroes. The
·
same thing is happening in other States.
But permit me to quote Judge Parker further:
"Nothing in the Const_i.tution or the decision of the Supreme
Court takes away from the people freedom to ch9ose the schools they
attend. The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It does not forbid such
segregation as occurs as the result of voluntary action. It merely
forbids the use of governmental power to enforce segregation. The
Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation upon the exercise of power by
the State or .State agencies, not a limitation upon the freedom of
individuals.
·
·
"The Supreme Court has pointed out that the solution of the
problem in .accord .with its decisions is the primary responsibility
of school authorities and that the function of the ·courts is to
determine whether action of the school authorities constitutes
'good faith ill\)lementation of the governing constitutional
• 1 es. I • • • fl
pr i nc1.p
.
.
·
Let me . emphasize Judge Parker's statements that "the Constitution
does not require integration,'' . and ~hat 11 it merely forbids the use
of governmental power to enforce segregation." These ·words are
extremely important to the officials .of the States and the schools,
as we consider means of maintaining our way of life under the
Constitution.
The solution to the problem lies in the hands of the States.
While the Congress never would have been able to amend the Constitutior
or to pass legislation, to declare separate school facilities
discriminatory, neither could it now enact legislation to overrule
the action of the Court.
·
There are not enough people in Washington concerned with the
same principles on which our Constitution was established to pass
such regulatory measures.
Therefore, the States and school districts must construct laws
and regulations within the principles stated by the Court. ·Not even
the edict of the Court prevents the adoption of t:ystems of c lassify,.~

. ..
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ing pupils other than that of race.
A friend has written me suggesting, facetiously, that I should
introduce a bill making all legislation by the Supreme Court subject
to review lzy the Congress • . I agree this would be just as- constitutional as what the Court itself has done.
I reject the contention of the propagandists who have convinced
some sincere persons that the Supre:ne Court has spoken and everybody
should bow to what the Court has declared "the law of the land."
Those persons who sought to· destroy the Constitution and the .
rights of the States did not meekly bow to the doctrine of "separate
but equal" established under the Constitution by the Plessy v.
Ferguson decisio~. Instead, for a half century, they conducted a
propaganda campaign against the .Constitution.~and against the decision
of a respected Court.
We might do well to adopt the tactics of our opponents. If
propaganda and psychological evidence are effective for our opponents,
they can be effective for us. , Our worthy objective of preserving
the Constitution justifies the method.
Not: only must the St:;~tes find substitutes for the constitutional _
practices which have been invalidated, they must also fight each
case with every legal weapon at their disposal. They must, at .the
same time, hold to the provision of equal facilities for the races,
in spite of the temptation to forget humane treatment for those who
exert pressures of propaganda and the courts.
..

In the Congress, I, for one, shall fight against every effort .
to enact legislation which I believe discriminatory against the
greatest minority group in this nation--the white people of the
South--who have been subjected to ~buse worthy of the dictators • .
I also propose to consider carefully every nomination made. by
the Chief Executive to the courts and to other positions of power • .,
If I find the appointee, by his actions and statements, to be ··
disqualified for the _trust he would assume, I shall vote against .
his confirmation. By this method, the Senate can exert its rightful
power in an effort to protect the Cons.t i_tution against further
inroads.
I deem it my duty, my solemn obligatipn, under my oath, to take
such action to defend the Constitution of the United States.
The process of adaptation of the Constitution to changing
times had attained a speed so great that in Smith v. Allwright in
1944, the late Justice Roberts declared that Supreme Court_ decisions
appeared to have taken on the attributes of restricted railroad
tickets, valid only for the date of their issuance.
As attorneys, you ptobably know that in the 18 years since 1937,
33 previously formulated principles of constitutional law have been
discarded or overruled by the Supreme Court. In the preceding 137
years of this nation under the Constitution, only 29 previously
established principles were overruled.
From the beginning, the lawyers of this country have had a
strong hand in making it a great nation. Of .the 56 men who signed
the Declaration of Independence, 25 were lawyers. Twenty-one of
the 39 delegates who drafted and signed the Constitution also were
lawyers. A high percentage of the members of the Congress and the
State legislatures today are lawyers. No other profession has
contributed so much to the establisl:unent and . the maintenance of ou r
Government.
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As your able and devoted forefathers fought the fights . of
liberty---on the ba.t tlefields and in the iaw-making bodies--! hope you will devote your legal talents to preserving the guarantees
of the Constitution. We have seen in other lands what happens fo the
rights of t ,he people when duly constituted government is destroyed.
'

.

'

.

we · cannot flinch at being chargecl with ."impeding progress."
The Supreme Court . by its decree has impeded the progress made in
75 years of work to provide equal and adequate public education
for the white and Negro children of the South. No accuser can point
his finger in any other. direction with as much accuracy.

THE END
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